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Watkins v. United States and Congressional
Power of Investigation
By HARTLY FLEISCHMANNt
A man may be subpoenaed to appear before a committee or subcom-
mittee of the Congress of the United States which may consist of one or
more men. In the presence of the committee staff and counsel and as well
of the press and perhaps radio and television, not to mention the general
public, he is extensively questioned about his beliefs, activities and associa-
tions past and present. These questions and these circumstances of inquiry
pose a very considerable personal dilemma for the unfortunate witness.
Similar questions about other persons will make the dilemma much more
serious, and the witness would be less than a man if he did not recognize
and attempt to avoid it. In Watkins v. United States' the Supreme Court
had this kind of situation before it and the opportunity was presented for
exposition and determination of the rights of an individual when they col-
lide with investigatory power of Congress. The direct decision of the issue
was avoided but part of the court managed to discuss it2 and thus to pro-
voke a cascade of comment and criticism from press and public and from
professional sources as well. Because the result in Watkins was to relieve
the defendant of the immediate duty of answering questions put to him by
an investigating committee of the House of Representatives and because
dicta in one opinion suggest broad limitations on the conduct of investiga-
tory committees the decision will be as dear to the "liberal" elements of the
polity as it has been offensive to those who fear the Communist threat.
Final evaluation of the case will naturally await the passage of time, the
occurrence of events and the usual "sober second thoughts"3 of the com-
munity. It will nevertheless be instructive to undertake a description of
the case and to relate it to what has gone before. At the same time, some
guarded predictions about what it means for the future are possible though
these, no matter how qualified, will be as infirm as such prognpstications
of Supreme Court actions must usually be.
Analysis will show that despite the breadth of language used by Chief
Justice Warren in his "Opinion of the Court" and by Mr. Justice Clark in
his lone dissent, the holding in Watkins is very narrow and while it may not
'" Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of Law. A.B. 1949, Harvard
University; LL.B. 1952, Harvard University. Member, San Francisco Bar, California Bar,
District of Columbia Bar.
1354 U.S. 178 (1957).
2 354 U.S. at 183-216.
3 Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARv. L. R.v. 4, 25 (1936).
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be the only possible one, it is clearly sensible and consistent with the facts
and with prior adjudications concerning both the congressional power to
investigate and in the general area of due process in the administration of
the criminal law.4 For the future, it can be said that the case demonstrates
a concern over the extent and proper exercise of the investigatory power
as it affects individual rights which may be expected to increase and which
now seems more likely to elaborate itself in the law than it has in the past.
This conclusion is based on statements in other cases taken in conjunction
with the opinion of Chief Justice Warren which had the concurrences of
Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan.
Considered only as an exercise of the judicial art, the opinion of the
Chief Justice is prolix, and it is so amorphous in content and organization
that any sort of predictive analysis is most difficult. Indeed, determination
of the precise holding is not certainly possible. Nevertheless it does suggest
limitations on the power of Congress to conduct investigations and, more
important, on its treatment of witnesses, and these will be taken up in later
paragraphs. But beyond consideration on narrow technical grounds, the
Chief Justice has written an energetic and heated essay. Essentially, it is
the response of a decent man to the dilemma of another decent man to
which he is sympathetic so far as his office will permit. As such, it will not
commend itself to legal scholars nor fit into nice legal categories. Mr. Chief
Justice Warren has tapped some of the feelings which must be and always
have been generated by the compelled disclosure of the past and present
activities and beliefs of friends and associates. Though these feelings are
not in the end the law of the Watkins case and though they may not be a
proper explicit basis for future opinions, it may be said that they must be
recognized and resolved before there can be any permanent and effective
accommodation of the competing interests of individual and legislature.
Background Decisions
The historical development and use of congressional investigations and
their legal underpinnings have been exhaustively covered elsewhere.5 It
will be helpful here to recognize that there are two general sorts of limita-
tions which must be considered and which will concern a court. First, the
power of the legislative body to conduct investigations will be in issue, and
4 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41
(1953); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
5 Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress to Investigate, 40 HARv. L.
Ray. 153 (1926); McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical Development, 18 Cm. L.
Rav. 425 (1951); Lashley, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope and Limitations,
40 A.B.A.J. 763 (1954); Merry, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope and Limita-
tions, 40 A.B.A.J. 1073 (1954). Note, The Power of Congress to Investigate and to Compel
Testimony, 70 HARv. L. REv. 671 (1957).
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second, granted the power in the abstract to inquire into a certain matter,
problems will arise when that power is thought to interfere either in its
scope or in the manner of its exercise with other rights. Of course, these
things are not so easy to separate in practice and the division is only a rule
of thumb, but the distinction will permit an assessment of the effect of the
Watkins case.,a The various principles which have evolved can be summar-
ized, and then it will be possible to see what effect the Watkins case has
on them.
In the first place, it was early established that Congress itself had the
power to punish those whom it found to be in contempt of it.' That is, the
offender could be compelled to appear at the bar of the House of Represen-
tatives or of the Senate and then imprisoned by either of those bodies. It
was held, however, that such punishment could only last until the next ad-
journment and that the power did not exist unless the condemned conduct
directly threatened or interfered with the functioning of Congress.7 A stat-
ute making contempt of Congress criminal was passed because of these
limitations." This statute has been sustained against Constitutional objec-
tion9 and for reasons of time and efficiency has been used almost exclusively
in recent years to enforce congressional power over recusant witnesses.10
The development of congressional investigatory power has been largely
through interpretation of this contempt statute.
A statement of the principles which apply to congressional investiga-
tions follows. These principles may be interpreted as limitations on, or at
least as definitions of, the scope of court review of this particular legisla-
tive activity, but they also establish substantive and procedural standards.
5a Compare the following language from Watkins:
"In the decade following World War II, there appeared a new kind of congressional in-
quiry unknown in prior periods of American history. Principally this was the result of various
investigations into the threat of subversion of the United States Government, but other sub-
jects of congressional interest also contributed to the changed scene. This new phase of legis-
lative inquiry involved a broad-scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens. It
brought before the courts novel questions of the appropriate limits of congressional inquiry.
Prior cases, like Kilbourn, McGrain and Sinclair, had defined the scope of investigative power
in terms of the inherent limitations of the sources of that power. In the more recent cases, the
emphasis shifted to problems of accommodating the interest of the Government with the rights
and privileges of individuals. The central theme was the application of the Bill of Rights as a
restraint upon the assertion of governmental power in this form." 354 U.S. at 195.
6Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
7Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897). On the question of a direct interference, see Marshall
v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521 (1917), where a defamatory letter sent to a congressional committee
was held not to be such an interference as would subject the defendant to summary contempt
punishment by Congress. The Court was careful to distinguish the criminal remedy where the
defendant would be heard.
8 52 STAT. 942 (1938) ; 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).
9 Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
10354 U.S. at 207.
Feb., 1959] CONGRESSIONAL POWER
1. The investigation must be in aid of a valid legislative purpose.
The courts will examine the purpose for which a congressional investi-
ion is being conducted by looking at the authorizing resolutions or statutes.
Although this purpose is always open to examination, the case of Kilbourne
v. Thompson" stands alone in its finding that no valid legislative purpose
existed which would justify the contempt citation of the defendant. It was
there held that an inquiry into the bankruptcy of Jay Cooke and Co. and
into the improvident investment of government funds with that enterprise
had no such legislative purpose as would permit questioning of the plain-
tiff about other members of a real estate pool to which he belonged and in
which Cooke had an interest. That interest would presumably have been
an asset of the bankrupt's estate. The Court, speaking unanimously through
Mr. Justice Miller, held that an inquiry into the private affairs of an indi-
vidual would not be permitted, at least in the absence of some mention in
the authorizing resolution of proposed legislation or of impeachment of the
official who had made the improvident investment. Without some such
purposes, the proceeding was simply a usurpation of the already existing
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
This statement is actually only a description of the result in Kilbourne,
since the precise basis for the opinion and the reason that there was no valid
legislative purpose cannot surely be known. The language does not make it
perfectly clear whether it would have been possible for Congress to define
any legislative purpose at all to justify the questions asked. Using a style
that is more colorful than usual for this period, but no clearer, Mr. Justice
Miller at once challenged the vagueness of the resolution-thus suggesting
that only some stylistic revision was necessary-and still suggested that
the whole matter could not constitutionally be investigated:
"The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint
of any intention of final action by Congress on the subject. In all the argu-
ment of the case, no suggestion has been made of what the House of Repre-
sentatives or the Congress could have done in the way of remedying the
wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co., or even the United
States. Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal affairs
of individuals? If so, the House of Representatives had no power or author-
ity in the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested
for the government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could
result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referred.
"What was this committee to do?
"To inquire into the nature and history of the real estate pool. How in-
definite! What was the real estate pool? Is it charged with any crime or
offense? If so, the courts alone can punish the members of it. Is it charged
with a fraud against the government? Here, again, the courts, and they
11103 U.S. 168 (1881).
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alone, can afford a remedy. Was it a corporation whose powers Congress
could repeal? There is no suggestion of the kind. The word pool, in the sense
here used, is of modem date, and may not be well understood, but in this
case it can mean no more than that certain individuals are engaged in deal-
ing in real estate as a commodity of traffic, and the gravamen of the whole
proceeding is that a debtor of the United States may be found to have an
interest in the pool. Can the rights of the pool or of its members, and the
rights of the debtor, and of the creditor of the debtor, be determined by the
report of a committee or by an Act of Congress?
"If they cannot, what authority has the House to enter upon this inves-
tigation into the private affairs of individuals who hold no office under the
government."'12
This seems to say that where Congress cannot legislate, it cannot investi-
gate, yet there is also the possibility that a valid purpose might have been
stated and that had the authorizing language been narrower, the investi-
gation might have escaped challenge.
In addition to the uncertainty over whether the difficulty in Kilbourne
could have been remedied by a differently drawn resolution, the opinion
also relies to some extent on the fact that the bankruptcy court already
had jurisdiction over the matter in issue.
Whatever its real ground of decision, the Kilbourne case read as impos-
ing any substantial limitation on the power of Congress has been greatly
qualified. Subsequent cases made it clear that the mere possibility of legis-
lation would be sufficient to establish a valid purpose for an investigation
and that such an investigation might proceed into fields where actual legis-
lation would not be allowed. For instance, Re Chapman,3 upholding the
constitutionality of the statute which makes contempt of Congress crimi-
nal, permitted its application to a question which would have required the
witness to disclose the names of various Senators with whom he had dealt.
The investigation was for the purpose of discovering if any Senator had
profited from speculations in the sugar market while certain legislation
was pending. Of course, Congress has the power to investigate into the con-
duct of its own members and to that extent Chapman is distinguishable
from Kilbourne, but the analogy is very clear. In fact, later cases have
obliterated the distinction the Court held in McGrain v. Daugherty1 4 that
even though no specific legislation was contemplated or mentioned in the
authorizing resolution, Congress could investigate corruption in the execu-
tive branch, and in so doing could require the papers and records of a pri-
vate person. It was not to be assumed that no legislation would eventuate
and, in addition, one of the functions of Congress is to see to the proper
1I Id. at 194-95.
'3 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
14273 U.S. 135 (1927).
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operation of the government. The court quoted with approval from the
Chapman case, saying:
"The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investi-
gation was to aid it in legislating; and we think the subject matter was
such that the presumption should be indulged that this was the real object.
An express avowal of the object would have been better; but in view of the
particular subject-matter was not indispensable. In the Chapman case,
where the resolution contained no avowal, this court pointed out that it
plainly related to a subject-matter of which the Senate had jurisdiction,
and said, 'We cannot'assume on this record that the action of the Senate
was without a legitimate object;' and also that 'it was certainly not neces-
sary that the resolutions should declare in advance what the Senate medi-
tated doing when the investigation was concluded.' ...,5
The Court went on to hold that investigation of the administration of the
Justice Department was a legitimate object and that possible disclosure of
certain crimes in the process did not adulterate it. This latter point was
raised again in Sinclair v. United States,"6 a case arising out of a related
investigation. There, the witness defended on the ground that the informa-
tion sought would have been useful in a criminal proceeding then pending
against him, a proceeding which had been specifically ordered by the Sen-
ate. The Court held that the fact that this might be one of the consequences
of the investigation did not demonstrate an invalid purpose. This result is
quite clearly inconsistent with the conclusion reached on the similar point
in Kilbourne v. Thompson.l "
McGrain, Sinclair and Chapman have created a weighty and very nearly
conclusive presumption 1 b that a valid legislative purpose exists when Con-
gress sets out to investigate. The presumption is reinforced in practice in
recent years by the increased number of investigations which have not been
questioned on such grounds and in theory by the enormous increase in the
legislative powers of Congress which attended the New Deal. Previous
holdings of the Supreme Court with regard to Communism and subver-
sion' 7 have established the power of Congress in those related fields, and
provide at least initial authority for investigations like the one at issue in
the Watkins case. Moreover, it has been held that the Court will not inquire
very far into the motives of Congress,' 8 and other cases make it clear that
15 Id. at 178.
16 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
16a Compare United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (DDC 1956), a perjury case where
the court refused to find competent a committee, which it found had the purpose of determin-
ing the defendant's guilt or innocence. This was an alternative holding.
16b But cf. United States v. Icardi, supra note 16a.
17 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; American Communications Ass'n, CIO
v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
18 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
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the investigatory power will not be confined strictly to subjects which are
clearly within the legislative province of the Congress. 9 It seems very clear,
therefore, that almost any investigation is prima facie valid and that objec-
tion must be taken, if at all, to specific aspects of an investigation to the
scope and manner of its conduct.
2. The investigation must be conducted within the scope of the authority
granted.
The courts will interpret the authority granted to an investigating com-
mittee in order to be certain that the investigation is being conducted ac-
cording to and within its terms. This has been a ground for striking down
contempt convictions and indictments 0 and other committee activities,'
and in recent years the principle has been applied to avoid difficult consti-
tutional questions.2 A contempt indictment must allege the authority of
the investigating committee so the Court can determine these questions.4
3. The examination of witnesses must be pertinent to the purpose of the
investigation.
The courts will decide the pertinency of questions asked or documents
required of a witness to the matters under investigation. Such a decision
is required by section 192 which provides for punishment only for refusal
to answer questions "pertinent to the question under inquiry,"2' and a
showing of pertinency is part of the government's case to be pleaded and
proved in such proceedings.' It would seem that some such requirement
would exist even in the absence of the statute. Pertinency is construed to
be broader than the traditional concept of relevance,26 but, it does embody
some limitation on the scope of an investigation.
19 McGrain v. Daugherty, supra note 14; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.
1947).
20 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953) ; cf. United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312
(2d Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D.Mass. 1956).
21Reed v. County Commissioners, 277 U.S. 376 (1928) (resolution authorizing congres-
sional investigation of vote frauds does not give committee power to bring suit to obtain pos-
session of ballots and ballot boxes).
22 United States v. Rumely, s-upra note 20.
23United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1956); cf. United States v. Kamin,
135 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1955) ; id., 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956).
2455 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952). This provision is set out in full at note 36
infra.
2 See: Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 296-97 (1929) ; Bowers v. United States,
202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953). The question of pertinency has been said to be one for the court,
Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 298 (1929), but in United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d
148 (3d Cir. 1953), the opinion says that it is for the jury to assess the evidence on this point.
Apparently the Court was to make the initial determination and then the jury was to be con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt. But cf. United States v. Lamont, 236 F.2d 312 (2d Cir.
1956) ; United States v. Kamin, 135 F. Supp. 382 (D. Mass. 1955) where the Court determined
pertinency.
2United States v. Orman, 207 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1953).
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4. The conduct of the investigation may be limited by provisions of the
Constitution which are applied by the courts.
There has been and continues to be considerable debate over the appli-
cability of various provisions of the Constitution to congressional investi-
gations. For instance, it is clear that the self-incrimination clause of the
Fifth Amendment applies. 7 Beyond this, the greatest concern is the First
Amendment and lower federal courts have rejected attempts to apply it to
investigating committees.2 8 The Supreme Court has avoided the issue2
The problem is in defining its proper application to questions about the
beliefs and associations of a witness and of his friends. Subsequent para-
graphs will take up these and other problems. It is enough to say here that
although they were avoided in the Watkins case they cannot be dodged
much longer and they are now very prominently in the minds of the Justices.
The Decision in Watkins v. United States
Mr. Watkins was a labor union official and organizer who was sub-
poenaed to appear before a subcommittee of the Committee on Un-Ameri-
can Activities of the House of Representatives. This committee was origi-
nally set up as a select committee in 1938"0 and in 194531 it was made a
standing committee of the House. The authorizing resolution provided:
"The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommit-
tee, is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (i) the extent,
character, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United
States, (ii) the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-
American propaganda that is instigated from foreign countries or of a do-
mestic origin and attacks the principle of the form of government as guar-
anteed by our Constitution, and (iii) all other questions in relation thereto
that would aid Congress in any necessary remedial legislation. 2
There was no specific delegation of the authority by the committee to the
subcommittee before which the petitioner appeared except a general reso-
lution:
"Be it resolved, that the Chairman shall have authority from time to time
to appoint subcommittees composed of one or more members of the Com-
27 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); cf. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155
(1955) ; Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
28 Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Morford v. United States,
176 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Lawson v. United States, 176 F.2d 49 (D.C. Cir. 1949) ; Barsky
v. United States, 167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d
Cir. 1947).
29 In addition to Watkins, see Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234; United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
3O H. Res. 282, 75th Cong., 3d Sess., 83 CoNG. Rzc. 7568, 7586.
3111. Res. 5, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 91 CONG. REc. 10, 15.
82H. Res. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CoNG. REc. 18, 24.
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mittee on Un-American Activities for the purpose of performing any and
all acts which the Committee as a whole is authorized to do."
33
The committee's mission, activities, and methods of operation have only
seldom been more specific than its authority."'~
As the government conceded, Watkins gave a candid and complete
catalogue of his past activities and political associations, including his re-
lationship to the Communist Party of which he had not been a member."
But when he was asked if he knew certain persons to have been members
of the Party, Watkins refused to answer, and he made the following state-
ment in explanation:
"I am not going to plead the Fifth Amendment, but I refuse to answer
certain questions that I believe are outside the scope of your committee's
activities. I will answer any questions about those persons whom I knew to
be members of the Communist Party and whom I believe still are. I will
not, however, answer any questions with respect to others with whom I
associated in the past. I do not believe that any law in this country requires
me to testify about persons who may in the past have been Communist
Party members or otherwise engaged in Communist Party activity, but
who to my best knowledge and belief have long since removed themselves
from the Communist movement.
"I do not believe that such questions are relevant to the work of this
committee nor do I believe that this committee has the right to undertake
the public exposure of persons because of their past activities. I may be
wrong, and the committee may have this power, but until and unless a
court of law so holds and directs me to answer, I most firmly refuse to dis-
cuss the political activities of my past associates."3 5 (Emphasis added.)
Though the opinions do not specifically advert to it, it will be seen at
once that the issue raised by the petitioner was a very narrow one. As indi-
cated by italicized sentences, it involved only very specific kinds of ques-
tions about persons he had known before, whose affiliations were not at the
time of inquiry known to him. However that may be, the refusal to answer
was reported to the House and the report certified to the United States
Attorney who obtained a seven-count indictment under 2 U.S.C. § 192.38
83 Quoted in 354 U.S. 211, n.50.
33a For background of this committee see Carr, The Un-American Activities Committee,
18 Cmr. L. REv. 598 (1951); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Un-American Activities
Committee, 47 COLumr. L. R V. 416 (1947).
34 354 U.S. at 183-85.
35 Id. at 185.
36 This statute reads as follows:
"Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the authority of either House
of Congress to give testimony or to produce papers upon any matter under inquiry before
either House, or any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two
Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, willfully makes default, or
who, having appeared, refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less
than $100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than one month nor more than
twelve months.' 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1952).
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Petitioner was found guilty on all counts. The conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia sitting en banc 7 That
court found that Congress had the power to investigate the history of the
Communist Party and to ask the questions Watkins had refused to answer.
It then decided that the committee was in fact authorized to conduct an
investigation into communist infiltration of labor unions, that this was a
valid legislative purpose, that the subcommittee was pursuing it and that
it had been made clear to the defendant through various statements by the
subcommittee chairman, as well as by the nature of the questions asked
and the witnesses called.
Judges Edgerton and Bazelon dissented.' They reached opposite con-
clusions on all these points and found that the purpose of the investigation
was only exposure and therefore not a valid one. They found no bona fide
investigation of any unions and no clear indication communicated or other-
wise that this was the reason for the interrogation of Watkins. Further-
more, the questions not answered by Watkins were not pertinent to any
authorized purpose of the committee. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari.8 9
The Court delivered three different opinions. The Chief Justice, speak-
ing as well for Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan, handed down the pre-
viously mentioned diffuse essay which progresses from a historical discus-
sion and acknowledgment of the power of Congress to conduct investiga-
tions, to some observations as to the various probable limits of this power
and then to a treatment of the applicability of Section 192 to Mr. Watkins.
At this final point the Warren opinion, ignoring its preceeding prose, ap-
parently holds simply that the "question under inquiry" referred to in Sec-
tion 192 was never made clear to the petitioner so that he cannot be con-
victed for having failed to answer questions allegedly pertinent." This
holding is based on a consideration of the authorizing statute for the
Un-American Affairs Committee which is said to be too vague, as are the
statements made by the subcommittee chairman at the time of inquiry.
The defect was not remedied by other attempts to define the precise inquiry
upon which the subcommittee was embarked, the variety of witnesses called
and of questions asked precluding such specificity. Accordingly, the peti-
tioner was convicted under a statute which did not establish an adequate
standard of guilt and well known precedents required reversal.
41
37 Watkins v. United States, 233 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
38 Id. at 688-95.
39 352 U.S. 822 (1957).
40 354 U.S. at 208-16.
41 United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) ; United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174
(1952); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948);
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939).
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Justices Frankfurter and Harlan concurred in a short opinion by the
former which states their conception of the Court's holding. This does not
include any of the Chief Justice's verbiage, but it does make very clear his
final result:
"While implied authority for the questioning by the Committee, sweeping
as was its inquiry, may be squeezed out of the repeated acquiescence by
Congress in the Committee's inquiries, the basis for determining petition-
er's guilt is not thereby laid. Prosecution for contempt of Congress presup-
poses an adequate opportunity for the defendant to have awareness of the
pertinency of the information that he has denied to Congress. And the
basis of such awareness must be contemporaneous with the witness' refusal
to answer and not at the trial for it. Accordingly, the actual scope of the
inquiry that the Committee was authorized to conduct and the relevance
of the questions to that inquiry must be shown to have been luminous at
the time when asked and not left, at best, in cloudiness. The circumstances
of this case were wanting in these essentials."42
Mr. Justice Clark in dissent speaks very strongly for the general power
of Congress to conduct investigations, mentioning several theretofore un-
questioned committee authorizations which he contended were at least as
broad and vague as the one in issue. This opinion then argues, first, that
Watkins was made aware of the matter under investigation and of the per-
tinency of the questions he was asked, and secondly, that no First Amend-
ment rights were violated.
The Effect of the Decision
The immediate limitations imposed upon the Watkins case, as on all
cases, by its facts and by the narrow holding of the majority of the Court
are obvious. But the opinion of the Chief Justice is wide-ranging and be-
cause it represents the thinking of four members of the Court, it deserves
consideration apart from its limitations. The principles stated earlier can
be measured against the Chief Justice's pronouncements and some ideas
for the future may be ventured.
1. It would seem clear that the Court has said nothing which can be
regarded as holding with respect to the scope of the congressional power to
authorize investigations. The approach taken, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter
makes clear, is the simple and sensible one of saying, "Before we can decide
whether you may invoke a criminal penalty for refusal to answer these
questions, we must first know what you are trying to accomplish and what
the questions have to do with it." While the Frankfurter opinion suggests
that sufficient authority for the questioning by the committee may be found
in previous congressional acquiescence43 and that this authority is valid,
42354 U.S. at 216-18.
43 1d. at 216.
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the Chief Justice does not necessarily agree. He hints that an authorization
so broad and indefinite cannot be valid, but he then goes on to say that such
vagueness may be overcome by other statements of purpose.44
A more important aspect of the Warren opinion is found in the follow-
ing excerpt:
"No one could reasonably deduce from the charter the kind of investiga-
tions the Committee was directed to make. As a result, we are asked to
engage in a process of retroactive rationalization. Looking backward from
the events that transpired, we are asked to uphold the Committee's actions
unless it appears that they were clearly not authorized by the charter. As
a corollary to this inverse approach, the Government urges that we must
view the matter hospitably to the power of Congress-that if there is any
legislative purpose which might have been furthered by the kind of dis-
closure sought, the witness must be punished for withholding it. No doubt
every reasonable indulgence of legality must be accorded to the actions of
a coordinate branch of our Government. But such deference cannot yield
to an unnecessary and unreasonable dissipation of precious constitutional
freedoms."'4
5
The precise meaning of this passage is not brought forth by the ensuing
verbiage so that it is not clear to what extent it qualifies earlier opinions.
It may be suggested that since the government's contention finds support
in the cases, 46 its rejection is an omen of some limitation on the presump-
tion of a valid legislative purpose, at least where there is likely to be a
"dissipation of precious constitutional freedoms."
As to the existence of a valid legislative purpose, the Chief Justice and
his colleagues also make the following statement:
"We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to expose for the
sake of exposure. The public is, of course, entitled to be informed concern-
ing the workings of its government. That cannot be inflated into a general
power to expose where the predominant result can only be an invasion of
the private rights of individuals. .. ,47
Once again meaning in or out of context is not certain. Contentions that
investigations which seek to "expose for the sake of exposure" are invalid
have been made and rejected chiefly on the ground that other valid pur-
poses existed which were not vitiated by any concommitant publicity.
48
While it will almost always be possible for Congress to demonstrate some
concurrent purpose other than exposure, this dictum of the Chief Justice,
44Compare id., pp. 201-05 with pp. 208-16.
4 5 1d. at 204.
46 See notes 14, 16 supra.
47354 U.S. at 200.
48 Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Watkins v. United States,
233 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1956) ; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Barsky
v. United States, 167 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947).
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together with the previously discussed weakening of the general presump-
tion in favor of a valid purpose, may permit a successful attack on some
investigations. Demonstration that no legislation had been passed or rec-
ommended over a period of years as a result of a committee's activities,
together with statements by the members of their purpose simply to expose,
might be sufficient, taken with the nature of the questions asked of a par-
ticular witness, to avoid a contempt citation. However, such facts appeared
in the Watkins case itself and were not part of any actual holding.
In summary, then, the Warren opinion does suggest some limitations
on the respect which previously has been given to the purposes of legisla-
tive investigating committees. Under just what circumstances these limita-
tions may come into play, we cannot be sure, but it may be inferred that
the Watkins situation is one of them, that it involves "precious constitu-
tional freedoms" so that the purpose of the investigation must be clearly
a valid one.
2. Closely related to the existence of a valid legislative purpose in the
context of the Chief Justice's opinion is the problem of vagueness in the
authorizing resolution. This is relevant to the determination of whether
the committee is acting within its authority as well as to the determination
of whether there is a valid purpose. Here, the Court is trying to find out
just what the authority was so that it can see if the committee was acting
within it. Because the Chief Justice emphasizes the vagueness of the
authorizing resolution for the Committee on Un-American Activities so
strongly, one may wonder if that alone is a sufficient reason for a witness
to resist questioning. The answer seems to be that it is not because later
on the opinion of the Chief Justice refers to various statements by com-
mittee members to see if they sufficiently apprised the witness of the pur-
pose of the investigation.49 Finding that they did not, he says that the com-
mittee has a duty to make its purpose and the pertinency of the questions
clear when the witness objects. It would seem that where this is done a wit-
ness cannot rely on the vagueness of authorizing resolution. An adequate
standard for a contempt finding may thus be established, at once preserv-
ing some flexibility for the Congress and protecting against the witness'
possible objections to the scope and purpose of the inquiry and to the perti-
nency of the questions.
3. On the question of pertinency there is again no holding in Watkins
and no discussion either, although the particular questions the defendant
refused to answer, being of very doubtful pertinency might have impelled
the Court's insistence on clarification of the committee's mandate. Never-
theless, the notion may be important for the future. In an effort to avoid
4 9 Supra note 44.
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decision of constitutional questions, the Court can be expected to write
more law about the concept of pertinency in congressional investigations.
At its broadest, the idea would comprehend a balancing of interests involv-
ing the power of Congress to investigate as against the rights of witness-
in this sense most questions involving a conflict of government and indi-
vidual are questions of pertinency. Limitations could be imposed on inves-
tigatory committees by a process of statutory interpretation or at least
through the medium of this idea. Such an indirect approach may have merit
in at least superficially enabling the Court to avoid an outright clash with
Congress, and new wine has been put into old bottles in stranger ways. On
the other hand, it does seem likely in view of other statements by various
members of the Court, that when a constitutional question is directly pre-
sented it will be decided as such.
Treated within narrower confines, the requirement of pertinency may
find its happiest application in a case like Watkins. The argument would
be that questions as to past associations and as to the beliefs and associa-
tions of others can never be pertinent to any investigations, at least of
Communism. This argument is developed in Judge Edgerton's dissent in
the Circuit Court of Appeals, where he says, inter alia:
"These questions concerned the presence of Communists in a union be-
tween 1942 and 1947. Their presence in unions then had little or nothing
to do with the question whether, at the time of the Committee hearing in
1954 Communists in unions were so numerous, so active, and so effective
as to create problems that called for legislation. This is true partly because
of the lapse of time, but chiefly because times had changed and legislation
had changed.
"Communist affiliation between 1942 and 1947 did not mean what
Communist affiliation meant in 1954 . .. 5
To this might be answered that such information would help the committee
to discover contemporary Communists through the individuals thus dis-
closed. Nevertheless, there exists the problem of remoteness which can be
recognized even while the broad investigatory power is granted.5 Beyond
this-and here the expanded concept of pertinency comes into play-the
courts might be persuaded to consider the undeniable social consequences
of disclosure to those told on and to the teller. Weighing these considera-
tions against the rather low contemperaneous informational value of the
desired answers as well as their possible availability from other sources the
50 233 F.2d at 691.
51 Compare Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953), where a contempt
conviction was reversed on grounds that questions by the Senate Crime Committee relating
to the defendant's activities in 1942 were too remote. In addition to remoteness in time, there
may be remoteness in scope where the question is very much broader than the inquiry being
conducted. United States v. Kamin, 135 F. Supp. 382 (D.Mass. 1955).
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conclusion that the question was not pertinent would be easy to reach. As
time passes, however, the nature of the Communist threat may not change
and the remoteness argument may not be so strong. Questions about past
beliefs and associations may then be shown to be pertinent to present con-
ditions so that some other rationale will have to be found, if limitations are
to be imposed. Possible alternatives are discussed in the following section.
Other Limitations on the Investigatory Power
Delegation. There exists the possibility of an initial limitation on the
activities of investigating committees which does not lend itself to ready
classification. It is suggested by the Chief Justice in both Watkins and
Sweezy and centers on the fact that most investigations are conducted by
very small subcommittees, some of them having only one or two members.
The danger of vesting so much power and discretion in so few men has been
pointed out and the practice has been condemned.5" Of course, wherever
there is a subcommittee, there is an additional problem of determining its
authority and this may be very much more difficult than in the case of the
parent committee because of the lack of any formal delegation. At least
one court has construed such authority very strictly,53 and it is not clear
in the Watkins and Sweezy cases whether the Chief Justice is relying on
this point alone. His language indicates, however, that he would go further
and that his concern is with the tenuous relationship between the investi-
gating body and the legislature. Speaking of the severe consequences of
exposure for the witness and of the consequent need for a clear mandate
from Congress in order to be sure that the committee has not gone too far,
the Chief Justice adds the following:
"More important and more fundamental than that, however, it insulates
the House that has authorized the investigation from the witnesses who are
subjected to the sanction of compulsory process. There is a wide gulf be-
tween the responsibility for the use of investigative power and the actual
exercise of that power. This is an especially vital consideration in assuring
respect for constitutional liberties. Protected freedoms should not be placed
in danger in the absence of a clear determination by the House or the Sen-
ate that a particular inquiry is justified by a specific legislative need."
54
Again, in the Sweezy case Chief Justice Warren and his colleagues find
fault with an investigation conducted by the Attorney General of New
Hampshire at the request of that state's legislature which wanted him to
look into violations of the subversive activities act. Relying again on the
breadth and vagueness of the authorization the opinion states:
5
2
GRiswor, TBE F= AMEDMXENT TODAY 29, 40-43, 45-46 (1955).
53 United States v. Kamin, 136 F. Supp. 791 (D. Mass. 1956).
54354 U.S. at 205.
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"The respective roles of the legislature and the investigator thus revealed
are of considerable significance to the issue before us. It is eminently clear
that the basic discretion of determining the direction of the legislative in-
quiry has been turned over to the investigative agency. The Attorney Gen-
eral has been given such a sweeping and uncertain mandate that it is his
decision which picks out the subjects that will be pursued, what witnesses
will be summoned and what questions will be asked. In this circumstance,
it cannot be stated authoritatively that the legislature asked the Attorney
General to gather the kind of facts comprised in the subjects upon which
petitioner was interrogated.
"Instead of making known the nature of the data it desired, the legisla-
lature has insulated itself from those witnesses whose rights may be vitally
affected by the investigation ....
"The conclusion that we have reached in this case is not grounded upon
the doctrine of separation of powers .... Our conclusion does rest upon a
separation of the power of a state legislature to conduct investigations from
the responsibility to direct the use of that power insofar as that separation
causes a deprivation of the constitutional rights of individuals and a denial
of due process of law." 55
Certainly the Sweezy case is distinguishable in more than one way from
Watkins, but it may not be without significance that both mention with
concern the separation of the actual exercise of investigatory power from
the responsibility for its exercise, and the significance persists even though
these statements can be fitted into the narrower holdings of both cases.
With regard to the exercise of committee power by subcommittees, the
first argument would be that Congress did not intend the delegation of its
vast investigatory power to one or two men. Here, the dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the case of Jay v. Boyd5 may be illuminat-
ing. That case involved the discretionary power of the Attorney General to
suspend deportation and upheld his right to rely on confidential informa-
tion in denying suspension. Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented without
reaching the main issue; 11 he said that Congress had intended that only the
Attorney General act according to his discretion and that there was no
intention to permit delegation of this essentially personal power to a hear-
ing officer or subordinate as had been done. Accordingly, while the Attorney
General might rely on undisclosed information if he saw fit, his subordi-
nates could not, and were required to make a full disclosure. Of course, as
Mr. Justice Frankfurter himself points out in Watkins, past congressional
approval may constitute authority for one-man investigating subcommit-
tees, and this is borne out by the previously quoted language of the author-
izing resolution of the Un-American Activities Committee which permits
55 354 U.S. 253-55.
N351 U.S. 345 (1956).
57 Id. at 370.
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delegation. 8 But this degree of delegation may not have been contemplated.
But beyond the question of what Congress intends, the language used
by the Chief Justice could be the basis for an argument of the constitutional
invalidity of vesting the power and discretion of the whole Congress in one
man. The argument might rest upon familiar, albeit not too vigorous, prece-
dents, 9 and on the fact that if the power to investigate is a function of the
power to legislate, then as there are limits on the delegation of the latter
there are also limits on the delegation of the former. The delegation argu-
ment gains additional weight when it is realized that the authority includes
power to issue subpoenas and to compel testimony on the most personal
and private matters. The Fourth as well as the First and Fifth Amend-
ments is in issue here and there seem to be no traditional safeguards.1a
First Amendment: The opinion of Chief Justice Warren speaks of limi-
tations on the power to investigate which will protect the rights of an in-
dividual witness called to testify before a committee. This raises problems
of what rights exist and when they will be protected. Reference has been
most frequent to the First Amendment6° and that is the Chief Justice's
main reliance; the purpose here is simply to see what Watkins adds to the
solution of these First Amendment questions without attempting to discuss
other rights a witness may have. The Chief Justice in his observations con-
cerning the First Amendment has the concurrence of three other members
of the Court, and earlier opinions reflect the concern of other Justices. For
instance, in United States v. Rumely6 the Court very frankly sidestepped
a First Amendment problem, all the while recognizing that it existed or
could have. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in a concurring opinion
by the latter which found that the First Amendment had been violated.62
So, too, in Tenney v. Brandkove63 the Court held that state legislators were
immune from suit under one of the Civil Rights Acts growing out of their
conduct of an investigation. Nevertheless, the opinion of the Court spe-
58 Supra note 32.
5 9 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
5Oa See GssswoLD, op. cit. supra note 52, at 46. For a discussion of the Fourth Amend-
ment problem in a slightly different context, see Note, The Power of Congress to Investigate
and to Compel Testimony, 70 HAuv. L. Ryv. 671, 673-74 (1957).
6 0 .g., Barenblatt v. United States, 240 Fed. 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Barsky v. United
States, 167 F.2d (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947) ;
Lashley, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope and Limitations, 40 A.B.A.J. 763
(1954); Merry, The Investigating Power of Congress: Its Scope and Limitations, 40 A.B.A.J.
1073 (1954). For an exhaustive discussion of the First Amendment's applicability see Comment,
Legislative Inquiry Into Political Activity: First Amendment Immunity from Committee Inter-
rogation, 65 Y=a L.. 1159 (1956).
61345 U.S. 41 (1953).
62 Id. at 48.
63 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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cifically pointed out that the result had no necessary application to other
aspects of legislative activity:
"It should be noted that this is a case in which the defendants are mem-
bers of a legislature. Legislative privilege in such a case deserves greater
respect than where an official acting on behalf of the legislature is sued or
the legislature seeks the affirmative aid of the courts to assert a privilege." 64
The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black goes even further to make it
entirely clear that he would not apply the immunity reasoning in a con-
tempt case where the unconstitutional conduct of the investigators was
raised as a defense.
6 5
Certainty that under appropriate circumstances a majority of the Court
will invoke the First Amendment is to be found in the Sweezy case where
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, concurring,6 6 clearly recognize and apply
such a limitation through the Fourteenth Amendment to an investigation
conducted by a state legislature. Similar recognition in a federal case would
insure at least six votes favorable to the application of the First Amend-
ment. Accordingly, the problem now becomes one of deciding when its
application will be appropriate. The possible circumstances and considera-
tions are kaleidoscopic, as in all cases involving the freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment so that prediction is very nearly impossible. Some
help may be found, however, in an examination of the kinds of questions
for which protection might be sought.
In the first place there are questions relating directly to the dissemina-
tion of literature and ideas. For instance in United States v Rumely6T there
were in issue questions about the identity of purchasers of books of a
"particular political tendentiousness" and there was a similar situation in
Tenney v. Brandove. Investigations which lead to questions of this sort
would seem to come within traditional concepts of First Amendment pro-
tection, so that the Court could determine the extent of the interference
and weigh it against the interest of the Congress.
Secondly, there are questions about a witness' own beliefs and associa-
tions, political or otherwise. These present more difficulty. Here there is a
recognizable First Amendment interest, but previous cases in the lower
federal courts have rejected such contentions,69 though some of them over
strong dissents." It has been held that a blanket objection to the authority
64
1d. at 378.
65 Id. at 379-81.
66 354 U.S. 255.
6 7 Supra note 61.
68S-upra note 63.
69 Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Barsky v. United States,
167 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1947).
7 o Barsky v. United States; United States v. Josephson, both supra note 69.
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of the Un-American Activities Committee to inquire into the beliefs of any
person is not well taken.7' Congress has a legitimate legislative concern in
the field of subversion and there can be valid legislation in the field of
thought and opinion. By the same token, challenge to specific questions on
the grounds that they would require the witness to disclose political affilia-
tions have been turned aside.72 It has been persuasively argued, and prob-
ably cannot now be successively countered, that the mere power to inquire
into beliefs and associations should not invalidate a congressional investi-
gation, but there remains a great deal of room to object to specific questions
in specific situations.
These narrower objections might be based on the right to remain silent,
though this has not been thought to be a part of the First Amendment guar-
anties.73 Stated thus baldly, there may be no right to remain silent, but to
the extent that silence implies conscientious scruple, it should be protected.
Compare, for instance, the famous language of Mr. Justice Jackson:
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, re-
ligion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein. If there be any circumstances which permit an ex-
ception, they do not now occur to us." 74 (Emphasis added.)
The italicized portion of this quotation would suggest some right to remain
silent in the face of official compulsion. Taken with the following words of
the Chief Justice in the Watkins case:
"The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify, against
his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of gov-
ernmental interference."
75
And with the statement in Kilbourne v. Thompson that Congress has no
right to look into the private affairs of a citizen,76 the Jackson words are
the basis of a strong argument that there is a protected right to keep silent.
The right to speak freely would seem necessarily to comprehend the right
to formulate one's thoughts and this cannot be done in the teeth of com-
pulsion to disclose them.
But there is no urgent need to consider any right to keep silent in vacuo.
What is of greatest concern to the Chief Justice is the effect of disclosure
upon the witness and the consequent restraint upon entertainment or ex-
71Supra notes 69, 70.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid. See also Van Aistyne, Congressional Investigations, 15 F.R.D. 471, 481 (1954).
74 ,Vest Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
75354 U.S. 197.
76Id. at 189, n.12.
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pression of unorthodox ideas. The rest of the paragraph just quoted from
Watkins is as follows:
"And when those forced revelations concern matters that are unorthodox,
unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of
the witness may be disastrous. This effect is even more harsh when it is
past beliefs, expressions or associations that are disclosed and judged by
current standards rather than those contemporary with the matters ex-
posed. Nor does the witness alone suffer the consequences. Those who are
identified by witnesses and thereby placed in the same glare of publicity
are equally subject to public stigma, scorn and obloquy. Beyond that, there
is the more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere
to the most orthodox and uncontroversial views and associations in order
to avoid a similar fate at some future time."
77
In Sweezy, the Chief Justice refers to Wieman v. Updegraff and its discus-
sion of the consequences of being excluded from public employment on
loyalty grounds. He then goes on to say:
"The sanction emanating from legislative investigations is of a different
kind than loss of employment. But the stain of the stamp of disloyalty is
just as deep. The inhibiting effect in the flow of democratic expression and
controversy upon those directly affected and those touched more subtly is
equally grave...,,79
Subsequent language of Sweezy makes the precise effect of this unascer-
tainable since it seems to impose some sort of scienter requirement before
a witness may be examined without explaining how it should apply. These
statements may further be qualified by saying that, since the consequences
of investigation and disclosure are so severe, it is most important that the
authority of the committee involved be made clear and that there is no
attempt to suggest limitations on a clearly drawn authorization. It would
be unrealistic so to limit these expressions and it seems clear that the Chief
Justice is speaking for another day and that he contemplates circumstances
in which his statements will have direct constitutional significance.80
The third kind of question which might be asked of a witness and might
conceivably be within the protection of the First Amendment is exempli-
fied by those actually in issue in Watkins; that is, questions about other
persons. Here, in addition to the consequences of disclosure for the witness
himself, there are similar penalties for other people who probably are or
were his friends. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
is available to a witness who would protect himself, but not always to one
who would protect others. It has been cogently pointed out that a man
77M. at 198.
78 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
79 354 U.S. 248.
80 See also Van Alstyne, op. cit. supra note 73, at 482.
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should not stand better for having protected himself than he does for hav-
ing protected his friends and associates."' The feeling against the "stool
pigeon," even the involuntary one, is too fundamental to be ignored by the
law in the absence of compelling necessity. It may be, however, that the
Court will find that the First Amendment is not a suitable container for
such notions; perhaps they come closer to the concept of due process of
law in its most basic sense, to some sort of fundamental notion of fair play8"
so that the besieged witness may find protection in the Fifth Amendment
instead of the First. But whatever the source of the protection, it seems
most likely that it will be recognized.
All this not to say that always in every case a witness will be entitled
to refuse to answer questions about himself or about others even where
beliefs, conscience or associations are concerned. There may be circum-
stances which justify compulsion; there may be a legislative purpose and
a legislative informational need to which such matters are pertinent and
which are so important as to justify inquiry in the face of whatever consti-
tutional provisions are thought to apply. Relevant here would be the nature
and gravity of the subject matter being investigated, the availability of the
information from other sources or the fact that it was already in the hands
of the committee, the consequences of disclosure and the real purposes of
the investigation. There must be urgent justification to permit such inter-
ferences with individual rights as the Chief Justice sees in some investiga-
tions but we will have to await further cases to define the permissible scope
of congressional power where it impinges on individual liberty. This is a
familiar constitutional process involving a case-by-case weighing of inter-
est and perhaps a test not unlike the clear and present danger test. What-
ever the terminology, this sort of adjudication will be necessary.83 It can
be seen in operation in this particular part of the civil rights field in the
concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Sweezy v. New Hamp-
shire where he recognizes a protectible First Amendment right of the wit-
ness and finds that it outweighs any conceivable danger to the government
of the State of New Hampshire from internal subversion. Such, it is sub-
mitted, must be the future course of decision in this area.
Conclusion
While the actual result in Watkins is narrow, the case brings closer to
decision the various problems of applying limitations to the investigating
committees of the Congress when their activities collide with individual
rights. The opinion of Chief Justice Warren, more impassioned than artic-
S1 GasworD, op. cit. supra note 52, at 26. See generally, id. at 24-26.
82 1d. at 31-53; O'BmiaN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1955).
8 Freund, The Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 4 VAD. L. REv. 151 (1953).
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ulate, suggests that such limitations may be found in the First Amendment
if not in the provisions of the contempt statute itself, and that they may be
justified by the obvious and undesirable consequences such investigations
have had on the individuals concerned and on the body politic. It may be
that his words will provoke Congress into self-regulation but in the absence
of that, they give good grounds to expect further pronouncements from the
Court which will more clearly define the rights of witnesses before commit-
tees of Congress.
